I. Introduction
Introduction: understanding adaptation in the context of social theory (E.C.H. Keskitalo and B.L. Preston)
The authors say we need to take a step back and look at our underlying theoretical assumptions before analyzing or evaluating adaptation policy.
Social science/theory tells us:
- Knowledge alone is not enough
- "Learning cannot per se be assumed" (e.g., facts leading to action cannot be assumed)
- Asking "Where can we go wrong?" can reveal underlying political limitations, competing priorities, and related trade-offs (p. 16)
If there's no dedicated adaptation funding, adaptation falls to the bottom of the political agenda.
Nobody has a good definition of "transformation" (resilience theory). Are criteria for transformation inevitably normative? (Favoring a certain kind of transformation, or favoring transformation over incremental change?)
How can a clearer definition of "transformation" help move us toward better adaptation policy? It doesn't tell us what triggers transformation (either transformation generally or the certain kind of transformation we want to see).
(1) The evolving interactions between adaptation research, international policy and development practice (I. Noble)
These are the author's descriptors of the stages in the evolution of adaptation policy (Table 1.1.) with the first item under each header in parentheses (the primary concept that arose in that stage):
- 19th c. early scholarship (Identifying the greenhouse effect)
- to 1965 (Can we model weather?)
- 1966-1989 Humans can affect Earth systems (First voices for adaptation scholarship)
- 1990s Mitigation is the priority (Focus on impact assessment)
- 2000-2005 Proactive adaptation is needed (Frameworks for adaptation action)
- 2006-2010 Who will pay? (Social vulnerability)
- post-2010 Just get on with it (Underlying drivers of vulnerability)
In the 2006-2010 section: at first there were few estimates of the financial needs for adaptation, it was just assumed they would be a lot cheaper than mitigation (GHG reduction). Then Nicholas Stern said in 2007 poor countries could sustain losses greater than 10% of their GDP because of climate change. Subsequent analyses produced higher projections. People stopped saying adaptation would be cheaper than mitigation.
Speaking of costs: someone at Brazil's Climate Change Research Group at the Ministry of Science and Technology posted the entire Stern report, or at least 662 pages of it (Amazon says it is 712 pages). The eBook is sold by the publisher for $84.
When people realized you couldn't pick a fixed end point for adaptation as a goal, they started zeroing in on the importance of assessing people's adaptive capacity, shifting from a focus on people's "end-point" to their "starting-point." This was a social vulnerability frame which clashed with the more prevalent risk-management frame, which was having trouble (still has trouble) monetizing and therefore largely ignored intangible gains and losses (life, human potential, like that) that are important in social vulnerability approaches.
In the post-2010 section: adaptation is not limited by lack of funding as much as "the social costs and consequences of changing livelihoods, of relocating homes and losing cultural assets." The author specifies that this is true in developing countries. I would say it is probably true everywhere.
The author points to different frameworks for avoiding maladaptation, recommending especially Stephane Hallegatte's 2009 framework for identifying robust adaptation options (Strategies to Adapt to an Uncertain Climate Change, in Global Environmental Change).
I've always referred to adaptation as the dinghy bobbling along behind the bigger, better-funded boat of mitigation, but the author sees them as twins, though adaptation is still lesser: "[a]daptation will likely remain the neglected twin within [international] negotiations." He sees it losing out to the "noisier mitigation sibling."
II. Theoretical frameworks and systems relevant to climate change adaptation policy research
(2) Challenges associated with implementing climate adaptation policy (M. Howlett, I. Mukherjee, S. Fritzen)
"Adaptive co-management (ACM)" is a new bit of jargon for me. Adaptive management + collaboration (presumably with groups outside your agency/organization). I don't know how I missed it, it's been around a while - in 2012 an article came out asking "is ACM a success?" (Adaptive Comanagement: a Systematic Review and Analysis - Plummer 2012). I have to wonder if anyone does non-collaborative adaptive management. If they do, it must be on a very small geographic scale, like, managing a turtle pond in your own back yard.
The chapter defines a "stakeholder"for a policy as "someone potentially concerned by, interested in, important to, or having any power over the policy being initiated." When I define stakeholder, I include those who are affected by the policy regardless of their level of awareness of, concern about, or interest in the policy. This definition points only to those already concerned about a thing, or potentially in a position to influence a thing. These are the people who may come to the table of their own accord, requiring no outreach. If that's all you've got at the table, you need to do better.
(3) The role of law and legal systems in climate change adaptation policy (J. Wenta, J. McDonald)
The South African Constitution from 1996, a visionary document by many standards, includes a right to a healthy environment. Adaptation measures can be predicated on this constitutional right. For reference/inspiration, here is the text of that part of the SA Constitution (Ch. 2, Bill of Rights: Section 24, Environment):
Everyone has the right:
a. to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and
b. to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that i. prevent pollution and ecological degradation; ii. promote conservation; and iii. secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.
The chapter defines a "stakeholder"for a policy as "someone potentially concerned by, interested in, important to, or having any power over the policy being initiated." When I define stakeholder, I include those who are affected by the policy regardless of their level of awareness of, concern about, or interest in the policy. This definition points only to those already concerned about a thing, or potentially in a position to influence a thing. These are the people who may come to the table of their own accord, requiring no outreach. If that's all you've got at the table, you need to do better.
(3) The role of law and legal systems in climate change adaptation policy (J. Wenta, J. McDonald)
The South African Constitution from 1996, a visionary document by many standards, includes a right to a healthy environment. Adaptation measures can be predicated on this constitutional right. For reference/inspiration, here is the text of that part of the SA Constitution (Ch. 2, Bill of Rights: Section 24, Environment):
Everyone has the right:
a. to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and
b. to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that i. prevent pollution and ecological degradation; ii. promote conservation; and iii. secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.
According to this 2016 Harvard Environmental Law Review article, the constitution also gives broad standing to "[a]nyone acting in the public interest" -- anyone can seek remedy in the courts on behalf of the public if they feel this right has been infringed. A beautiful thing, if it can be made meaningful in practice.
A note on the hazards of bottom-up decision making: "There is [...] a risk that devolving adaptation measures to the local level fails to account for externalities, particularly relating to public environmental values." -- This is important to remember if you are prone to saying "mitigation is global but adaptation is local." It might BE local but SHOULD it be, only and always?
(4) Moving from incremental to transformational change in climate adaptation policy? An institutionalist perspective (J. Munck af Rosenschöld, J. G. Rozema)
The "new institutionalist" descriptor is new to me. "New institutionalism" considers the influence of institutional settings when considering human behavior. Wikipedia's "New Institutionalism" article says it's a school of thought focusing on how institutions interact with and affect society.
The authors want to discuss how institutions slow down adaptation ("[o]ur goal here is [...] to explore the role of institutions, both formal and informal, in slowing down changes in adaptation"). Formal institutions are rule systems; informal institutions are "the context in which adaptation occurs and new strategies emerge," such as societal norms and cognitive scripts.
This chapter repeatedly advances the presumption that transformational adaptation is better than incremental adaptation. Big changes = better. "Move fast and break things," I guess.
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I'm hoping this book at some point deals with the question of defining effective adaptation and criteria for measuring effectiveness. Is any intentional adaptation by definition successful because it was attempted? So far that seems to be the working definition.
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(5) Enabling conditions for the mainstreaming of adaptation policy and practice (D. Russel)
This chapter introduced me to the idea of integration (of policies, administrative bodies, etc.) being either positive or negative. Negative integration is where the goal is avoiding conflict, where the parties just "rub along together," whereas positive integration is focused on achieving collective goals, perhaps entailing compromises on the part of the parties involved, either on their own goals or their ways of working. The latter is the more difficult kind of integration, and probably more effective, but the former ("rubbing along") is more common. And, better than no integration at all.
Here's an interesting question: can mainstreaming be transformational? Or is it by definition an incremental approach? (The author points to one study on this question, "Is mainstreaming transformative? Theorizing mainstreaming in the context of diversity and deliberation" - J. Squires 2005).
Oooh, another new word for me: "problematique." Wikipedia says it refers to a "meta system of problems" inherent in global problems, and it's another way of saying "wicked problem" (or "mess").
"While society-based approaches [to mainstreaming] have yet to be discussed in relation to climate change adaptation, their focus on the behaviour of actors in wider society fits the adaptation problematique well because [...] it requires coordinated action among a myriad of stakeholders across the public and private spheres of society."
(6) Unpacking the potential role of social learning in adaptation policy (G. Cundill, B. Harvey)
This chapter defines social learning as: "a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual to become situated within wider social units or communities of practice through social interactions between actors within social networks" (citing Reed et al. 2010, "What is social learning").
Adaptive management used social learning to address uncertainty by treating policies as large-scale, multi-decadal experiments.
Collaborative management used social learning to resolve issues between stakeholders and build consensus for collective action.
Adaptive co-management brings together adaptive management's "learning-by-doing" emphasis and collaborative management's collective/inclusive decision-making emphasis.
A participatory process is not necessarily an example of social learning.
Power dynamics between actors may be at the root of a less-powerful person adopting the position of someone with power, and that factor is not sufficiently studied in social learning theory. Some forms of deliberation might be better than others at addressing power differences between participants.
(7) The Promise and limits of participation in adaptation governance: moving beyond participation towards disruption (A. Oels)
The author asserts that stakeholder-driven processes reproduce the status quo.
To her, disruption > participation, if social transformation is the goal. She defines transformational adaptation as (a) desirable, (b) addressing the roots of vulnerability by changing "the system."
She contrasts the theories of Jürgen Habermas, who has an optimistic view of public participation (that it leads to a rational outcome), and Michel Foucault, who has a pessimistic view of public participation (the status quo wins, the roots of vulnerability go unaddressed).
Habermas' public participation that results in a rational outcome takes place in an "ideal speech situation" where both fairness and competence are evident. In the presence of these things, the "better argument" wins. The roots of vulnerability are addressed, and the most vulnerable are protected.
Turning to Foucault, we see how the fairness criterion cannot be met because speech is coded with power - it is gendered, learned, exclusive. Cultural norms are reproduced in the deliberative process just as in everyday interactions. There is always a power struggle in a deliberative process. One particularly convincing truth or set of truths wins. The vulnerable who are convinced they are not vulnerable (or, maybe more often, are convinced they can't do anything to reduce their vulnerability) decide not to go with the business-as-usual path.
Better outcomes can be achieved, perhaps, if the "vulnerable" are brought in as co-leaders at the beginning of the deliberative process so that they aren't cast as the less-powerful being brought in only as participants in the process designed by the more-powerful. (This is stakeholder engagement 101, and should be obvious, in my humble opinion.)
Unless there is a "systemic shift in dominant constellations of power and knowledge," the status quo is upheld by public participation in a deliberative process. There might be incremental change, but nothing more. That systemic shift is what the author refers to by "disruption." One form this disruption might take is in the performance of new realities ("performatively enact[ing] new realities"), such as when undocumented immigrants assert rights they don't officially have in their adopted home country.
Fantasy, theatre, and role-play can help bring about these systemic shifts. Therefore, our public processes around adaptation should incorporate these elements. (This sounds like the participatory scenario planning process, where two critical deep uncertainties are interplayed and resulting near/mid/distant future "headlines" and response actions are brainstormed. It helps participants explore multiple plausible futures-of-concern.)
The author makes an interesting pitch for resisting instead of adapting. She supports the idea of residents of low-lying island nations not just migrating away, but asserting that they will not be moved -- performing a new reality wherein the loss of their land is not inevitable -- and so potentially fueling a stronger push for greenhouse gas mitigation.
(8) Research methodology for adaptation policy analysis: embracing the eclectic messy centre (M. Purdon, P. Thornton)
This chapter is written in extremely dense jargon interspersed with sentences like "When you are hungry, it seems reasonable to assume that you are thinking about food." One take-away I gleaned: stand-alone case studies alone are not enough to draw conclusions about how/why adaptation policies are developed: comparative methods are needed. Another: informal institutions matter, especially in the developing world.
Next: Part III: Understanding Adaptation Policy Development and Implementation at Different Levels and Country Contexts
This chapter defines social learning as: "a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual to become situated within wider social units or communities of practice through social interactions between actors within social networks" (citing Reed et al. 2010, "What is social learning").
Adaptive management used social learning to address uncertainty by treating policies as large-scale, multi-decadal experiments.
Collaborative management used social learning to resolve issues between stakeholders and build consensus for collective action.
Adaptive co-management brings together adaptive management's "learning-by-doing" emphasis and collaborative management's collective/inclusive decision-making emphasis.
A participatory process is not necessarily an example of social learning.
Power dynamics between actors may be at the root of a less-powerful person adopting the position of someone with power, and that factor is not sufficiently studied in social learning theory. Some forms of deliberation might be better than others at addressing power differences between participants.
(7) The Promise and limits of participation in adaptation governance: moving beyond participation towards disruption (A. Oels)
The author asserts that stakeholder-driven processes reproduce the status quo.
To her, disruption > participation, if social transformation is the goal. She defines transformational adaptation as (a) desirable, (b) addressing the roots of vulnerability by changing "the system."
She contrasts the theories of Jürgen Habermas, who has an optimistic view of public participation (that it leads to a rational outcome), and Michel Foucault, who has a pessimistic view of public participation (the status quo wins, the roots of vulnerability go unaddressed).
Habermas' public participation that results in a rational outcome takes place in an "ideal speech situation" where both fairness and competence are evident. In the presence of these things, the "better argument" wins. The roots of vulnerability are addressed, and the most vulnerable are protected.
Turning to Foucault, we see how the fairness criterion cannot be met because speech is coded with power - it is gendered, learned, exclusive. Cultural norms are reproduced in the deliberative process just as in everyday interactions. There is always a power struggle in a deliberative process. One particularly convincing truth or set of truths wins. The vulnerable who are convinced they are not vulnerable (or, maybe more often, are convinced they can't do anything to reduce their vulnerability) decide not to go with the business-as-usual path.
Better outcomes can be achieved, perhaps, if the "vulnerable" are brought in as co-leaders at the beginning of the deliberative process so that they aren't cast as the less-powerful being brought in only as participants in the process designed by the more-powerful. (This is stakeholder engagement 101, and should be obvious, in my humble opinion.)
Unless there is a "systemic shift in dominant constellations of power and knowledge," the status quo is upheld by public participation in a deliberative process. There might be incremental change, but nothing more. That systemic shift is what the author refers to by "disruption." One form this disruption might take is in the performance of new realities ("performatively enact[ing] new realities"), such as when undocumented immigrants assert rights they don't officially have in their adopted home country.
Fantasy, theatre, and role-play can help bring about these systemic shifts. Therefore, our public processes around adaptation should incorporate these elements. (This sounds like the participatory scenario planning process, where two critical deep uncertainties are interplayed and resulting near/mid/distant future "headlines" and response actions are brainstormed. It helps participants explore multiple plausible futures-of-concern.)
The author makes an interesting pitch for resisting instead of adapting. She supports the idea of residents of low-lying island nations not just migrating away, but asserting that they will not be moved -- performing a new reality wherein the loss of their land is not inevitable -- and so potentially fueling a stronger push for greenhouse gas mitigation.
(8) Research methodology for adaptation policy analysis: embracing the eclectic messy centre (M. Purdon, P. Thornton)
This chapter is written in extremely dense jargon interspersed with sentences like "When you are hungry, it seems reasonable to assume that you are thinking about food." One take-away I gleaned: stand-alone case studies alone are not enough to draw conclusions about how/why adaptation policies are developed: comparative methods are needed. Another: informal institutions matter, especially in the developing world.
Next: Part III: Understanding Adaptation Policy Development and Implementation at Different Levels and Country Contexts
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